バイナリ操作によるLinuxディストリビューション全体に対するTrusting-Trust攻撃
Trusting-Trust Attack against an Entire Linux Distribution (arxiv.org)
要約
本論文は、Ken ThompsonのTrusting-Trust攻撃がコンパイラ固有のものではなく、GNU stripのような一般的なビルドユーティリティにも適用可能であることを示しています。NixOSのブートストラッププロセスにおいて、改変されたstripバイナリを使用することで、ソースコードを検査しないユーティリティであっても、ビルドプロセス全体にバックドアを埋め込み、最終的な環境にまでその影響を及ぼす攻撃手法を実証しています。
全文翻訳
Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
arXiv:2607.24888 (cs)
[Submitted on 27 Jul 2026 (v1), last revised 15 Sep 2026 (this version, v2)]
Title:Trusting-Trust Attack against an Entire Linux Distribution through Binary Manipulation
Authors:Julien Malka, Aman Sharma, Martin Monperrus, Stefano Zacchiroli, Théo Zimmermann
View a PDF of the paper titled Trusting-Trust Attack against an Entire Linux Distribution through Binary Manipulation, by Julien Malka and 4 other authors
Abstract:Ken Thompson's trusting-trust attack, in which a compromised compiler backdoors the programs it builds and reproduces the backdoor in subsequent rebuilds of itself, is widely regarded as a threat specific to compilers. We show that it is not. We construct a complete trusting-trust attack around GNU strip, an ordinary build utility that neither inspects nor generates source code, using only manipulations of finished ELF files. In the bootstrap of the NixOS Linux distribution, a single tampered strip in the binary seed implants a payload that propagates from one generation of strip to the next and survives into the final standard environment after the seed leaves the dependency closure. On a real nixpkgs revision, the attack builds a complete graphical installer without failures and backdoors almost every one of its binaries, enabling arbitrary malicious behavior of the subverted packages.
| Subjects: | Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Software Engineering (cs.SE) |
| Cite as: | arXiv:2607.24888 [cs.CR] |
| (or arXiv:2607.24888v2 [cs.CR] for this version) | |
| https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2607.24888 arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite | |
| Related DOI: | https://doi.org/10.1145/3848003.3848012 DOI(s) linking to related resources |
Submission history
From: Julien Malka
v1 Mon, 27 Jul 2026 12:59:15 UTC (1,848 KB)
v2 Tue, 15 Sep 2026 13:25:36 UTC (1,820 KB)
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View a PDF of the paper titled Trusting-Trust Attack against an Entire Linux Distribution through Binary Manipulation, by Julien Malka and 4 other authors
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