石油市場のバッファーはどれだけ残っているか？

The Depletion Ledger

DashboardModelGitHub

石油は、意識していなくても日常生活の一部です。自動車の燃料、物資の輸送、食料生産を支える燃料に精製されます。また、衣服などの製品の原料にもなります。

2026年2月に米国とイスラエルがイランと戦争を開始して以来、世界は生産量よりも多くの石油を消費しています。サウジアラビアのバイパスパイプラインは再稼働しましたが、攻撃や制限により依然として輸送が混乱しています。ロシアの製油所への攻撃と輸出禁止措置も燃料不足を招いています。10月20日、ブレント原油の12月限は1バレル100ドルを超えました。備蓄石油が供給不足を補っていますが、米国戦略石油備蓄（SPR）は1982年以来の最低水準です。

Depletion Ledgerは、石油供給、燃料価格、そしてそれが人々とビジネスに与える影響を追跡します。チャートは、3つの可能なシナリオ下での貯蔵量の変化と、それぞれの確率を示しています。予測は保存され、実際の出来事と比較できるようになっています。

最終更新日：2026年10月20日

PricesSupplyRefiningEffects on the economyWatch list

Red SeaPersian GulfArabian SeaIranSaudi ArabiaYemenOmanHormuz7.6M b/d · 56% below pre-warRed Sea3.5M b/d · 24% above pre-war

Kplerの10月12日までの7日間平均確定値。最近の数値は暫定的なもので、貨物が確認されるにつれて上昇する可能性があります。戦前の基準値：ホルムズ海峡は1日あたり17.1Mバレル、紅海は1日あたり2.8Mバレル（2025年3月～2026年2月の平均）。これらはEIAの下記測定値とは異なります。紅海の流量には、バブ・エル・マンデブ海峡通過交通量だけでなく、迂回されたサウジアラビアからの輸出も含まれます。

Brent

$108.79

10月20日決済 · 12月限 · $0.76安

US diesel (AAA)

$6.32

10月20日 · 2度の連続下落後の初の上昇 · 戦前比+70% $3.72

US gasoline (AAA)

$4.28

10月20日 · 1月比+52% $2.81 (AAA)

SPR

283.0M

10月9日 · 週次で変動なし · 戦前415.4Mから132.4M減 · 1982年11月以来の最低水準

US diesel & heating oil

102.6M

10月9日 · 週次で2.5M減 · 前年比12.3%減 · 東海岸在庫は前年比22%減

Prices

これらのチャートは、石油、ガソリン、ディーゼル、天然ガスの価格がどのように変化したかを示しています。ブレント原油は原油価格の広く使われるベンチマークです。ガソリンとディーゼルチャートは米国の全国平均を使用し、天然ガスチャートはヨーロッパとアジアをカバーしています。キャプションは、測定値の出所を説明しています。データが欠落している箇所にはギャップを残しています。

US gasoline prices are up 52%

EIA weekly and AAA daily national averages

全国平均は1月から$2.81から$4.28に上昇し、約52%増加しました。価格は5月に最高値の$4.50に達しました。3月以降、毎月の平均価格は危機前の水準を上回っています。

US diesel prices are up 70%

AAA national average · dots on selected dates

ディーゼル燃料の価格は、戦争直前の2月27日に$3.72でした。9月22日には過去最高の$6.53に達しました。10月20日現在、$6.32で、前日より上昇しています。これは依然として戦前の価格より約70%高い水準です。2022年6月に記録された以前の最高値約$5.85を9月4日に初めて超えました。

Europe’s latest assessed gas price is up about 140%

TTF, $/MMBtu. Filled dots: EIA weekly futures averages. Hollow dots: assessments and market quotes, including converted euro quotes. Sep 14 uses a contract for difference (CFD), which tracks gas prices. Contracts and delivery periods differ; comparisons are approximate.

TTFはヨーロッパの天然ガス価格を追跡します。JOGMECの10月9日の評価額（10月13日発表）は、11月納入分で$26.70となり、10月2日の$24.60から約140%上昇しました。JOGMECは、この価格上昇を海峡でのタンカー攻撃の再燃、ヨーロッパの寒冷な天候、ノルウェーのDvalinおよびHeidrun鉱床での生産制限に関連付けています。

2026年1月20日までに、ヨーロッパのガス貯蔵量は48%に低下しました。これは5年平均の63%と比較して低いです。貯蔵量が少ないため、ヨーロッパは海峡が閉鎖された時期に液化天然ガス（LNG）を即時納入のために購入していました。

Natural gas prices in Asia are up about 145%

JKM, $/MMBtu. Filled dots: EIA weekly futures averages (Jan–Apr). Hollow dots: assessed spot prices and market quotes (May–Oct). Contracts and delivery periods differ, so comparisons are approximate.

JKMはアジア向け液化天然ガス（LNG）の価格を追跡します。JOGMECの10月13日の報告によると、10月9日の価格は26ドル台前半（ここでは約$26.20）で、10月2日の24ドル台後半から約145%上昇しました。海峡での攻撃は供給懸念を再燃させましたが、買いは依然として低調でした。カタールのラスラファン複合施設の損傷したユニットは、同国のLNG輸出能力の約17%を占めており、3～5年間オフラインになると予想されています。在庫が少ないため、供給が中断された際に消費者が頼れるものが少なくなっています。

Brent and WTI prices are up more than 40%

Brent: selected observations and monthly averages. WTI: weekly FRED spot prices and recent futures closes.

10月20日、ブレント原油は$108.79で決済され、$0.76安でした（eOption/AFP）。WTIの満期を迎える11月限は$101.79で決済され、表示されている12月限の終値は$98.10でした（Yahoo）。

ブレントは選択された観測値と月次平均を組み合わせており、灰色のWTIは週次スポット価格と最近の先物終値を組み合わせています。空の点は丸められた推定値を示しています。契約変更は9月23日（WTI）、10月1日（ブレント）、10月20日（WTI）の比較に影響します。最新のWTIの変動は、より安価な12月限への切り替えと価格下落を組み合わせており、単一契約の動きではありません。

The gap between diesel and crude prices has nearly doubled

Retail fuel price minus WTI, dollars per barrel. EIA/AAA fuel prices; FRED and recent futures closes for WTI.

このチャートは、原油価格（WTI）を燃料の小売価格から差し引いたものです（ドル/バレル）。この差額には、精製、輸送、小売コストが含まれます。これにより、原油価格が安くなってもポンプ価格が上昇し続ける理由を説明するのに役立ちます。ディーゼル燃料の差額は9月23日にバレルあたり$181.8でピークに達し、10月20日には$167.3に緩和されましたが、1月の$89のほぼ2倍です。ガソリンの差額は10月20日に$81.6で、1月の約$59から上昇しました。原油価格がポンプ価格よりも速く上昇した場合、これらの差額は縮小することがあります（9月10日など）。

10月20日のより安価なWTI契約への切り替えは、これらの差額を機械的に拡大させます。同日のWTI価格がない測定値は、1～3日以内の最も近い取引日の価格を使用します。欠落している価格は推定されません。EIAの公式なクラックスプレッドは卸売燃料価格を使用するため、これらの値とは異なります。

Supply

世界が生産量よりも多くの石油を使用すると、その差は貯蔵量から補われます。これらのチャートは、貯蔵石油の変化、さまざまなシナリオ下での在庫の増減の可能性、および米国の緊急備蓄に残っている石油の量を示しています。

The world is using more oil than it produces

戦争前、世界は1日あたり約400万バレル多く石油を生産していました。戦争開始以来、ほとんどの月で貯蔵石油を使用して不足分を補っています。EIAは7月に在庫がわずかに増加したと推定しています。IEAの10月14日の報告は、年間供給損失を1日あたり580万バレル、世界の石油の約6%と推定しており、中東の石油流量は2027年まで正常を下回ると予想しています。EIAは8月の世界の生産量を1日あたり1億400万バレルと推定しています。IEAの9月の報告では、8月に湾岸地域の生産量の1000万バレル以上が停止したままでした。サウジアラビアの生産量だけでも、その月は230万バレル減少し、597万バレルとなりました。

IEAは32カ国から4億バレルの放出を調整しました。中国の商業在庫からの引き出しは、税関データに基づくと1日あたり約2～300万バレルと推定されていますが、公式備蓄は未だ手つかずです。9月9日の報告で、EIAは世界の商業在庫が今年約4億バレル減少したと別途推定しています。この数値と、2月下旬から9月にかけて引き出された5億9000万バレルというIEAの推定値は、異なる期間の異なる在庫セットをカバーしています。

World production minus consumption, million barrels/day. EIA Short-Term Energy Outlook (STEO), Table 3a, January–September 2026; forecasts aren't shown. Gulf production outages peaked at 11.2 million barrels/day in May; lower consumption and supply from elsewhere offset much of the loss. Separately, the IEA’s October 14 report estimates that observed stocks fell by 509 million barrels from the end of February through September, an average of 2.4 million barrels/day. September’s decline was 10 million barrels: stocks on land fell by 113 million, partly offset by a 103 million barrel increase in oil on water.

Oil shipments through Hormuz fell 77%

EIAは、ホルムズ海峡を通る原油出荷量が2025年末の1日あたり1590万バレルから2026年4月～6月には370万バレルに減少したと推定しています。精製燃料の出荷量も減少しました。バブ・エル・マンデブ海峡を通る原油出荷量は増加しましたが、スエズ運河とエジプトのSUMEDパイプラインの交通量は2025年末の水準近くを維持しました。

これらの4月～6月の数値は、紅海が7月に閉鎖される前のものです。より最近の交通量については、ページ上部の地図に表示されているKplerの7日間平均を参照してください。

Million barrels per day · Annual averages for 2023–24; quarterly averages from 2025

Sources: EIA World Oil Transit Chokepoints (March 3, 2026) and Global Energy Security Data (August 12, 2026). Hollow dots mark EIA estimates: annual averages for 2023–24 and quarterly averages from 2025. Lines connect those averages. All three charts use the same scale. The 77% headline uses EIA's total for Hormuz, 21.6 to 4.9 million barrels a day; the two rounded components shown add to 4.8 in April–June. The figures cover global traffic, and a cargo can pass through more than one route. Ship tracking became less reliable around Hormuz in 2026, so those estimates may miss some traffic.

Kpler's map figures cover crude and other oil-related cargoes, excluding LNG, NGLs and Iranian-origin strait transits. Verified movements without tracking signals can be included. The pre-war baselines use March 2025–February 2026 averages with the same definitions. They differ from the EIA's periods and coverage, so the percentages aren't directly comparable. Kpler says recent preliminary figures have typically risen 1.5–2 times as more cargoes were confirmed; that is a historical pattern, not a forecast range.

Adding ship-to-ship transfers in the Gulf of Oman raises Kpler's Hormuz total from 7.6M to 9.3M barrels a day, 46% below its 17.1M baseline. Tanker crossings averaged 13 a day versus 50 pre-war; only 3 were confirmed for Oct 12.

Red Sea flows include rerouted Saudi exports. They don't measure traffic through Bab el-Mandeb alone: Yanbu lies north of the strait, so cargoes can leave the port without passing through it. Kpler reported two tankers at Yanbu on Oct 10. Separately, Reuters reported 49 crossings over Sep 26–27, with no tracked Saudi oil shipments.

Shipping attacks have continued every week since July

The UK Maritime Trade Operations centre (UKMTO), run by the Royal Navy, collects reports from merchant ships in the Gulf, the Red Sea, and the Gulf of Aden. UKMTO recorded at least 2 attack reports in each complete week shown. Oil can keep moving through these routes while ships are still being attacked.

These are reported attacks, not a count of every attack. UKMTO says some strikes probably go unreported. Hijackings, advisories, and suspicious activity are recorded separately and aren't included here.

Source: UKMTO attack reports, Jul 1–Oct 20, 2026. Weeks run Monday–Sunday, using incident dates where available and logged dates otherwise. Lighter bars mark partial weeks; the latest week is still in progress.

How the reports are counted

This chart uses reports #78 through #177, as of Oct 20, 2026. UKMTO numbers reports for the year; 77 came before this chart's start, including three before the war began on February 28. We keep earlier entries as UKMTO's recent-incidents page moves forward. The 25 reports classified as hijackings, advisories, or suspicious activity aren't counted as attacks.

Reports #167–169 were logged on Oct 12 without event dates in their text. Maritime reporting places those attacks on Oct 11, so their assignment to a week remains uncertain.

Reports #99, #100, and #125 are missing from the captured page. The Joint Maritime Information Center's August 4 update records Egyptian authorities identifying #99 and #100 as likely drone attacks. Those two reports aren't included in the bars, and #125 remains unaccounted for. Other unreported attacks may also be missing.

Oil stocks in OECD countries fell to a five-year low in June 2026

The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) includes the US, Canada, Mexico, Japan, Korea, Australia, and much of Western Europe. This chart shows crude oil and refined fuels stored on land by companies and governments in those member countries. These stocks help make up for interruptions in supply. China isn't an OECD member, so its stockpiles aren't included.

In June 2026, the latest month shown, stocks were at their lowest in the EIA data since January 2021. The shaded band shows the range for each calendar month from 2021 through 2025. Stocks fell below that range in April, May and June 2026.

Company and government oil stocks held on land. EIA international data, monthly, January 2021–June 2026, in million barrels. Shaded range: 2021–2025. The vertical line marks the start of the war on February 28, 2026.

How oil in storage could change through 2027

These scenarios show how global oil stocks could change if shipping recovers, the standoff continues, or the corridor closes. Zero marks the August 2026 stock level, not empty tanks. The revised paths start at September's reported value; the dark line tracks reported stocks.

We revised the paths on October 15 after September's results. The scenarios were less accurate than the recent-trend baseline in the first scored month. See forecast results, assumptions and model changes.

EIA forecastRecent trendSeptember 19 paths (v1)

Select a comparison to see the EIA's October 6 outlook, the June–August trend (−47.7 million barrels a month), or the original September 19 paths. All use the same August reference level.

Change since August 2026, in million barrels. We adjust production and consumption from the EIA's October 6 outlook for each scenario — the October 15 v2 revision, starting at the observed September. The EIA comparison uses its October 6 outlook: a September estimate followed by forecasts from October. Recent trend repeats IEA-reported changes. The solid dark line is the IEA's reported global observed inventories (October 14, 2026 edition), through September 2026. The two agencies' figures cover different sets of oil stocks. The scenarios don't calculate further cuts in oil use as stocks fall.

The model's odds for each outcome

Our estimates, updated when events meet the rules on the model page.

The bars show our estimated chance of each outcome and how those estimates have changed. The colors match the three lines above. A higher percentage means we think that outcome is more likely. It doesn't tell you how accurate the storage projection will be.

Sep 29

The repaired Saudi bypass pipeline is carrying about 3.5M barrels a day, close to the 4M it carried before the drone strikes, and tanker loadings at Yanbu have resumed (Wall Street Journal, Sep 28). We moved the odds toward standoff based on that report, making an exception to our rule requiring official confirmation or an assessment that repairs would take only days.

Sep 22

Reuters reported that the bypass pipeline had restarted at a reduced rate, with the first cargo at Yanbu scheduled to load on Sep 22. We moved the odds back toward standoff on that report.

Sep 16

Oil loadings at Yanbu, the pipeline's export port, stopped while the pipeline remained shut. Oil could no longer leave through the Saudi bypass. In Libya, guards shut the Hamada–Zawiya pipeline, halting two oil fields.

Sep 11

The Saudi bypass pipeline was suspended, and the Houthis held the entire Red Sea coast. An official pipeline restart would return the odds to 10/50/40.

corridor holdsstandoffcorridor lapses

Show earlier odds (Jun 30–Sep 9)

Sep 9

Tanker losses reached 10 per week, Brent passed $100, and Jazan was affected.

Sep 7

An area was closed to shipping, and a base in a third country was hit for the first time.

Sep 2

Vessel tracking showed 7% of normal crossings through Hormuz and did not support reports that 8.6M barrels a day were passing through.

Jun 30

Our first estimate: about a 65% chance that the conflict would ease.

Corridor holds

10%

Tankers can pass through Hormuz under an Iran–Oman agreement or with US escorts. Traffic gradually returns to normal over one to two quarters.

In this scenario, Brent moves toward $70–80.

Standoff

50%

Fighting continues at the current level. Tanker attacks and shipping restrictions continue, some Iranian facilities remain out of service, and the repaired Saudi bypass operates at a reduced rate. The strait stays partly open.

Brent stays in the $100–120 range. Oil stocks keep falling through 2027. We assume Gulf production stays at the same level.

Corridor lapses

40%

The shipping route closes for a prolonged period or the fighting gets worse. More tankers are lost, shipping restrictions remain, and the bypass, Abqaiq, and Jazan stay out of service for months.

Brent rises above $130. Shortages spread from the US East Coast to Russia, Europe, China, and aviation fuel.

We use judgment to assign these odds and set rules in advance for changing them. A pipeline restarting or a shipping agreement breaking down could prompt a change; a quiet week alone wouldn't. You can read the rules and see what we're watching on the model page.

US commercial crude stocks have recovered from their July low

These stocks exclude the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR). They stood at 415.6 million barrels on Oct 9, up from 404.5 million on Jul 24. The EIA's Oct 15 report shows stocks fell by 8.6 million barrels, the second straight weekly decline and the second-largest weekly withdrawal of 2026. Crude imports fell by 0.8 million barrels a day that week, to 6.0 million a day. Stocks were 8.2 million barrels below the same week last year. SPR releases have helped supply commercial oil users this year. Moving oil from the reserve to commercial storage leaves the combined amount unchanged.

EIA weekly stocks, excluding the SPR, in million barrels. The Jul 24 low was 22.2M below the same week in 2025.

The Strategic Petroleum Reserve is at its lowest level in 44 years

EIA weekly ending stocks, million bbl

The Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) is the US government's emergency supply of crude oil. It was created after the energy shortages of the 1970s. The reserve held 415.4 million barrels when the war began. The latest report, for the week ending Oct 9, puts it at 283.0 million, unchanged on the week after a 0.8 million barrel decline the week before. Weekly withdrawals have slowed from 3.1 million barrels in the week ending Aug 28. For comparison, the reserve peaked at 727 million barrels in December 2009 and stood at 270.5 million in August 1982. The releases help make up for supplies that can't leave the Gulf.

SPR deliveries depend on contracts and schedules

SPR stocks were unchanged in the week ending Oct 9, after falling by about 112,000 barrels a day the week before. A flat week doesn't establish that future deliveries have stopped. DOE's September offering scheduled deliveries for November–December. On Oct 16, DOE sought bids to exchange up to 17 million barrels. This request does not confirm the earlier awards of 20–25 million barrels reported by Argus, citing sources, on Oct 13. Separately, DOE authorized hurricane-related exchanges of up to 4 million barrels on Oct 10, including accelerated deliveries under an existing award.

The red lines mark the model's reserve thresholds, or floors. At about 300M barrels, some caverns risk damage and can't safely be refilled after a withdrawal. The first report below that threshold was for the week ending Aug 7, at 298.7 million barrels. The other floors are 250M, the GEF minimum for sustained withdrawals; 180M, the hard operating limit; and 70M, the Department of Energy's stated safe minimum.

Refining

Crude oil has to be refined before it can be used as diesel, gasoline, or jet fuel. That makes refinery capacity just as important as the amount of oil available. US refineries are processing more oil than last year, while processing has fallen elsewhere and strikes continue to damage Russian refineries. The IEA describes the global refining system as “stretched to the limit.” Atlantic Basin refining margins reached records in August, led by diesel.

Replacing Gulf crude can raise costs for refineries

Straight-run (distillation) yield, % of barrel volume

Different crude oils produce different mixes of fuels. Heavier oil needs extra processing, energy and sometimes hydrogen. Lighter oil can overwhelm some equipment while leaving other units underused. A refinery may have to pay for modifications or cut output, spreading fixed costs over fewer barrels.

These examples compare US shale, Gulf crude, and heavy sour crude (diluted bitumen) using three of the 42 lab reports, called assays, in ExxonMobil's public library. It's a small sample, chosen for availability and contrast. The bars show straight-run yields: the parts separated by heating the oil, before further processing into finished fuels. The parts used for diesel and jet fuel make up 39.2% of WTI Light – Export, 34.9% of Upper Zakum, and 18.1% of Kearl.

The heavier parts need more equipment. Most complex refineries can process vacuum gas oil, but the heaviest residue needs specialized equipment, such as a coker, to break it down. Residue makes up 31.4% of Kearl, compared with 16.5% of Upper Zakum and 4.1% of WTI. That helps explain why heavy crude from Canada or Venezuela can't quickly replace missing Gulf supplies. The next chart shows how much of each type the world produced before the war; the diesel price gap chart shows how fuel prices have diverged from crude prices.

WTI Light – Export · Light sweet (US shale), 47.4° API, 0.07% S

diesel + kerosene fractions: 39.2%

butane and lighter 3.0% (gases)

Upper Zakum · Medium sour (Gulf), 33.4° API, 2.09% S

diesel + kerosene fractions: 34.9%

butane and lighter 3.1% (gases)

Kearl Blend · Heavy sour (diluted bitumen), 19.8° API, 3.83% S

diesel + kerosene fractions: 18.1%

butane and lighter 1.4% (gases)

naphtha (light + heavy) — becomes gasoline after further processingkerosene — jet fueldieselvacuum gas oil — cracked in most complex refineriesvacuum residue — needs a coker or residue hydrocrackerbutane and lighter gases

First-stage yields by volume, not finished fuel output. Upper Zakum stands in for Arab Light; Kearl stands in for Venezuela's Merey; no public assays of Arab Light or Merey are in that library. These are examples, not averages for their classes. Naphtha combines light and heavy naphtha; vacuum gas oil (VGO) is the 350–550 °C portion; residue is what remains above 550 °C. Assays: WTI Light – Export, WTLEX26Y, Feb 27, 2026; Upper Zakum, UPZAK26B, Jan 23, 2026; Kearl Blend, KEARL23B, Oct 26, 2023. Dates as printed in the reports. Source: ExxonMobil's crude oil assay library. Processing requirements: EIA. Lighter-crude constraints: EIA's study of processing light shale oil.

Refineries built for medium-sour crude can't easily switch supplies

million barrels per day · world, annual

Many refineries are built for medium-sour crude: oil with a medium density and high sulfur content. Switching to other grades can require major changes that take years. ExxonMobil's Beaumont expansion began construction in 2019 and started operating in 2023.

The chart below shows how the world's supply of different types of crude changed before the war. Medium-sour crude accounted for 32.8% of production in 2024. Its share had been falling while light, sweet crude grew from 18.7% in 2010 to 23.0% in 2024. Refiners had invested in equipment for heavier oil before the shale boom, so the growing supply of lighter crude doesn't suit every plant equally well.

The war has cut supplies of the medium-sour oil those plants were built to use. The IEA's September report put lost Gulf production at more than 10 million barrels a day (August 2026). Several of the Gulf's main export grades sit in this chart's medium-sour band (26–35° API): Arab Light (32.8°), Arab Medium (30.2°) and Basrah Medium (27.9°, Iraq's largest export grade since 2021). The IEA does not break the shut-in down by grade, so how the loss splits across the bands is not known. The production data ends in 2024; the annotation above the 2024 column shows the loss reported in 2026, across all grades.

over 10 mb/d of Gulf output shut in(Aug 2026, IEA), all grades2040608002010201520192024medium & sourheavy & sourother gradeslight & sweetultra light20406080020102015201920202021202220232024medium & sour40.4% to 32.8%heavy & sour8.1% to 9.8%other grades29.3% to 30.7%light & sweet18.7% to 23.0%ultra light3.6% to 3.8%over 10 mb/d of Gulf output shut in(Aug 2026, IEA), all grades

World crude production, million barrels per day. Eni's ten quality classes are grouped into five; “other grades” combines six classes and unassigned production (0.7% in 2024). Reported years: 2010, 2015 and 2019–2024. Source: Eni, World Energy Review 2025 (21 Oct 2025), using IEA data; table on printed p96, definitions on p9 (PDF pages 98 and 11). Annotation: IEA Oil Market Report, 11 Sep 2026 (August 2026 data); it marks the total loss, not a single grade. Gulf export-grade properties: Wikipedia (Arab Light, Arab Medium) and Petro-Logistics (Basrah Medium, 27.9° API / 3.0% S, Iraq's main export grade since 2021; Basrah Light export stopped in Jan 2022). Gulf losses also include lighter grades such as Murban and heavier grades such as Arab and Basrah heavy. Refinery configuration: IEA and EIA. Beaumont construction timeline: ExxonMobil.

OECD refineries made less gasoline and diesel than a year earlier

In July 2026, total refinery output in OECD countries was essentially unchanged from July 2025. Gasoline and diesel output fell. Jet fuel and other kerosene rose. The comparison doesn't tell us how much of the change was caused by the war.

Estimated million barrels per day · July 2026, change vs July 2025

OECD refinery intake and oil product output, July 2026, change versus July 2025OECD, July 2026 versus July 2025, estimated million barrels per day. We convert metric tonnes using UN conversion factors. The crude oil factor approximates the mixed refinery intake; "other products" uses an assumed 8.0 barrels per tonne. Oil entering refineries: 40.3, +0.3% versus a year earlier. Refinery output: 41.9, −0.1% versus a year earlier. Gasoline: 13.4, −0.6% versus a year earlier. Diesel & heating oil: 12.6, −0.4% versus a year earlier. Jet fuel & other kerosene: 4.4, +5.8% versus a year earlier. Other products: 11.5, −1.2% versus a year earlier. Band widths are proportional to volume on one shared scale, so the product bands add up to the refinery output band.Oil entering refineries40.3+0.3%Refinery output41.9−0.1%Gasoline13.4−0.6%Diesel & heating oil12.6−0.4%Jet fuel & other kerosene4.4+5.8%Other products11.5−1.2%

Oil coming in

Oil entering refineries40.3 +0.3%

After refining

Refinery output41.9 −0.1%

Products coming out

Gasoline13.4 −0.6%

Diesel & heating oil12.6 −0.4%

Jet fuel & other kerosene4.4 +5.8%

Other products11.5 −1.2%

Band widths show estimated daily volumes on the same scale. The four product bands add up to refinery output. Output is higher than input because refined products are less dense than crude oil, so a refinery yields more barrels than it takes in. Refiners call this processing gain. Percentages compare July 2026 with July 2025. We convert the IEA's figures from metric tonnes using UN conversion factors: 7.32 barrels per tonne for oil entering refineries, 8.50 for gasoline, 7.23 for diesel, and 7.77 for kerosene. The 7.32 factor is an approximation because refinery intake includes crude and other raw materials. For the mixed "other products" category, we assume 8.0 barrels per tonne. Source: IEA Monthly Oil Statistics, October 2026, tables 1 and 7. The figures include estimates.

US refineries ran below 95% of capacity for a fourth straight week

Share of available refinery capacity in use, weekly.

US refineries operated above 95% of their available capacity every week from Jun 5 through Sep 11, reaching 98.0% in the week ending Aug 28. In the week ending Oct 9, they used 93.5% of their capacity and processed 135,000 more barrels a day than the week before. For the January–October weeks shown, refineries used an average of 90.7% of their capacity in 2025 and 93.6% in 2026. Fuel exports also reached a record 8 million barrels per day in August, according to OPEC. US plants are working close to capacity, but shortages in Europe, Asia, and Russia continue to put pressure on fuel supplies.

EIA Weekly Petroleum Status Report (WPULEUS3), weeks ending Friday. Utilization is the amount processed divided by available capacity. Both lines cover the same Jan–Oct period. Monthly crude inputs to refineries ran 15.9–17.4 million barrels/day in the January–September months (STEO Table 4a, Oct 6 release), above 2025 in every month. The fuel price gap chart in Prices shows how fuel and crude prices compare.

Global refining

Refineries elsewhere are processing less oil. These figures from the IEA's monthly Oil Market Reports show the size of the decline.

Global refining, August

81.4 mb/d

summer peak, −4.2 mb/d below a year ago (OMR, Sep 11)

Refining forecast, 2026

−2.3 mb/d

IEA forecast vs 2025 — global runs 81.7 mb/d this year (OMR, Oct 14; the Sep ed had −2.6)

Q3 forecast revision

−370 kb/d

Reduction in the Q3 refining forecast (OMR, Aug 12)

Estimates put Russia's lost refining capacity at 20–54%

Strikes on Russian refineries are reducing the amount of fuel available to other countries. The line connects reported estimates: about 75% of capacity remaining by mid-April, about 70% by Aug 29 (Moscow Times), and about 49% by Oct 4 (Ukraine's Defense Ministry). The red bar shows how much the estimates differ. The Defense Ministry says 51% was struck (Oct 4), Russian Forbes puts lost capacity at 54% (Sep 9), and the IEA estimates more than 20%. You can compare these figures with the outages and export restrictions below. The Defense Ministry's claim hasn't been independently verified.

Estimated capacity remaining, as a share of capacity before the strikes

Russian refinery outages and fuel shortages

Capacity out of service

51%

UA Defense Ministry, Oct 4 (Khmara) — up from >45% (Sep 21) and ~30% (Aug 29, Moscow Times)

Russian Forbes: 54% (Sep 9) · IEA: more than 20% · Dallas Fed: as much as 60% over summer 2026 · Kpler: refineries operating at 60% of capacity (Oct 10, FT); estimates vary month to month · the 51% claim can't be independently verified (AP)

Refineries and industrial sites struck, Sep 20–Oct 16

12 plants

Moscow refinery (Sep 20) · Kuibyshev, near Samara (Sep 21–22) · Ufa (Sep 21–22) · Perm, ~257 kb/d (Sep 25) · Novoshakhtinsk, ~110–140 kb/d (Sep 25) · Ilsky, ~125 kb/d — three killed (Sep 26) · Lukoil-Volgograd (Oct 2) · Gazprom Neftekhim Salavat, one of Russia's largest (Oct 8) · Omsk, Russia's largest, ~440 kb/d — second hit (Oct 8) · Lukoil Ukhta, Komi (Oct 9) · Ryazan, processing unit shut — repeat strike (Oct 15) · Surgut district, Khanty-Mansi — condensate plant per UA tracking (unverified) (Oct 16)

Volgograd halted crude processing (Reuters, Oct 6). Ryazan’s CDU-6 shut after the Oct 15 attack; three other primary units remain operational (Reuters, Oct 16). Current operating status at Omsk and reported halts at Ufa, Salavat and Ukhta remain unverified. The Surgut facility’s identification as a condensate plant is unconfirmed; the Oct 14 Saratov claim isn’t counted. An Oct 20 fire in Tambov was identified by Astra as the Nikolskoye pumping station on the Druzhba pipeline (Moscow Times). Pumping-station and terminal damage doesn’t establish a refinery shutdown.

Major refinery outages

Ryazan partly operating

Kirishi, Russia's second-largest, ~404 kb/d, reported halted in early September (UA.NEWS, Sep 2) · Ryazan, Moscow's main supplier, ~344 kb/d: CDU-6 shut after the Oct 15 strike; three other primary units operating (Reuters, Oct 16)

Capacity figures describe the whole plants, not measured lost output. Kirishi’s current operating status has not been verified.

Gasoline shortages at gas stations

45–53%

Share of stations without AI-92 (45%) or AI-95 (53%) gasoline, mid-September (gdebenzin, via UNN, Sep 22); rationing has returned in about two-thirds of regions (Independent, Sep 22)

Gasoline prices +21% YTD (Moscow Times, Sep 14) · IEA: diesel output down about 30%, with waits of up to 40 hours (Oct 5)

Jet fuel now imported

military + civilian

Russia is importing Jet A-1 from South Korea and Egypt (UA military intelligence, Aug 29); no jet fuel or gasoline has left Russia by sea for two straight weeks (S&P Global CAS, Oct 1)

ISW (Sep 26): Geran drones use jet fuel; a kerosene shortage would limit their use

When Russia’s export bans expire

Russia's export restrictions leave less fuel available to other countries during the heating season. On Sep 30, Russia extended its diesel export ban for producers through Oct 31 (government decree; Moscow Times, Reuters); on Oct 10, Moscow said the ban was partially lifted with immediate effect. Novak said deliveries could rise from 300,000 tons in October to 1M in December, potentially reaching 3M tons a month in the medium term (Interfax, Oct 12). The jet-fuel export ban, in force since Jun 1, ends on Nov 30. Damaged refineries also leave Russia with less fuel for its own gas stations and military as winter approaches.

Oct 31, 2026

diesel exports by producers — ban extended through Oct 31 (government decree, Sep 30), then partially lifted Oct 10. Novak’s announced schedule is 300,000 tons in October, 500,000 in November and 1M in December (Interfax, Oct 12). US license 135 permits diesel transactions through Apr 7, 2027; the Oct 16 Graham Act waiver leaves existing sanctions in place. Neither changes Russia’s export rules. Verified diesel deliveries remain the test.

Nov 30, 2026

jet fuel exports

Jan 31, 2027

gasoline exports and diesel exports by non-producers

Russian diesel and gasoil shipments out of Black Sea ports fell to zero in the week to Sep 24 — the first time on record (S&P Global Commodities at Sea, Oct 1); a year ago those ports sent out around 200,000 tonnes a week. S&P also reported no seaborne jet-fuel or gasoline exports for two straight weeks.

Imports aren't making up the difference, even with fuel shipments on the Belarus rail route at 25 times last year's volume. The shortage also affects Kyrgyzstan, which imports more than 90% of its gasoline from Russia and has about six weeks of reserves left.

On Oct 1, Putin called a proposed trade — halting attacks on ships in the Black Sea in exchange for halting strikes on refineries — "absurd," and estimated the strikes had cost Russia about 1% of GDP. In the US, President Trump has blamed the refinery strikes for the diesel-price surge: "This isn't really a Middle Eastern problem; this is more of a Russia problem" (Fox News, Sep 27). After the strikes resumed, he called them "a disgrace" (Newsmax, Oct 15).

Effects on the economy

Higher energy costs affect more than your fuel bill. They can slow business activity, keep inflation high, and eventually make food more expensive. People and businesses also use less oil when they can no longer afford it. Economists call this demand destruction. Below, you can compare oil use with last year's levels and see the latest recession estimates, interest rates, and possible effects on food prices.

World oil use fell about 5% in May compared with last year

World oil and other liquid fuel use, million barrels/day. EIA STEO, Oct 6 release; January–September, 2026 vs 2025.

World oil use fell 4.7 million barrels per day below last year's level in May, a decline of about 5%. The gap narrowed to 3.9 million in July and 1.1 million in August, then widened slightly to 1.8 million in September. Using less oil helps contain prices, but it also reflects the strain on the economy.

The IEA now expects demand to fall by 2.5 million barrels per day across 2026, compared with its August estimate of 1.6 million. It expects the quarterly decline to ease from 5.3 million in Q2 to 3.4 million in Q3 and 2.0 million in Q4, followed by a 2.6 million barrel per day recovery in 2027. The losses are concentrated in fuels such as diesel and in raw materials used to make chemicals, especially in Asia. OPEC expects a different result: demand growth of 0.4 million barrels per day in 2026. That's a difference of 2.9 million between the two forecasts.

EIA STEO Table 3e, Oct 6 2026; forecast completed Oct 1. The release lists Jan–Sep as historical data, though world and regional consumption figures are estimates. They include fuel used by refineries and ships. Forecasts from Oct 2026 onward aren't shown.

Where oil use fell in July

Million b/d, July 2026 vs July 2025 — same table.

World

−3.9

105.6 → 101.8 mb/d

Middle East

−1.3

10.2 → 8.9 mb/d

Asia & Oceania

−1.9

37.9 → 36.0 mb/d

China

−0.8

16.4 → 15.6 mb/d · part of Asia & Oceania; using stockpiles to support consumption

Europe

−0.1

14.8 → 14.7 mb/d

United States

−0.6

21.2 → 20.6 mb/d

Estimates of US recession risk

These estimates, published between June and October 2026, put the chance of a US recession at 13% to 50%, with different forecast windows. Goldman Sachs has kept its estimate at 15% since Jun 26, down from 30% in late March. It repeated that estimate on Sep 14. Polymarket priced its recession contract at about 34% on Oct 16. It runs through the end of 2027 and resolves on either two consecutive quarters of falling real GDP or a recession announcement by the National Bureau of Economic Research. Its window and rules differ from the forecasts above.

The Fed raised rates on Sep 16

The Federal Reserve can cut interest rates to help a slowing economy, but inflation makes that harder when prices are still rising too quickly. September producer prices rose 6.3% from a year earlier — the largest annual increase since December 2022 — with energy prices up 10.8% for the month alone. Consumer inflation ran 3.7% in September, with core inflation at 2.6%.

On Sep 16, the Fed voted 12-to-0 to raise rates by a quarter of a percentage point, citing elevated inflation. According to the Wall Street Journal, 16 of the 18 officials projected at least one more increase this year. Higher borrowing costs add to the pressure from rising energy prices.

Fed's target rate, Sep 16

3.75–4.00%

Up 0.25 percentage points in a 12-to-0 vote · statement: 'Inflation remains elevated. … The Committee will deliver price stability.'

Odds of a rate increase, Oct 27–28

60%

Our estimate, published Sep 16 · 16 of 18 Fed officials projected another increase this year · we'll check this prediction after the October decision

September producer prices (BLS, Oct 15)

6.3% YoY

+1.3% for the month, the largest since Mar 2022 · goods +2.6% for the month — energy +10.8%, gasoline +20.3% · Aug revised to 5.6% annually

The European Central Bank says Germany and Italy could both be in a technical recession by the end of 2026 if the conflict continues.

Borrowing costs and inflation

Borrowing costs and everyday prices are both at multi-year highs. In its Sep 16 rate decision, the Fed said inflation remained high and the economy was growing at a solid pace.

US 10-year Treasury yield

10-year US Treasury yield, % · chart through Oct 20 · weekly closes (FRED) · Sep 11, Sep 14–18, Sep 21–25, Sep 28–30, Oct 1–2, Oct 5–9, Oct 13–16, Oct 19–20: Yahoo closing values.

The 10-year Treasury yield is the rate the US government pays to borrow for a decade. It also influences mortgage and business loan rates. It has risen by about one percentage point, or 100 basis points, since before the war. Inflation and concerns about government debt are both putting pressure on rates. The national debt exceeds $40 trillion, and $8.4 trillion of Treasuries must be refinanced by year-end.

The 10-year yield closed at 5.117% on Oct 20, its nineteenth straight close above 5% — still below the war's high close of 5.311% on Oct 5. Its quarterly increase was the largest since 1994, helping push US mortgage rates above 7% (Wall Street Journal, Oct 1). On Oct 2, the G7 reserve-release announcement and a weak September jobs report cut expectations of another Fed hike.

The 2-year yield was 4.63% on Sep 11, its highest since July 2024. The 10-year breakeven inflation rate, a market indicator of expected inflation, was 2.35% on Oct 14 (FRED), near pre-war levels. With Treasury yields higher and this measure little changed, yields after expected inflation are higher too.

US producer prices are rising faster than consumer prices

CPI (retail, amber) + PPI final demand (wholesale, blue) · % year-over-year · monthly (BLS) · CPI Jan – Sep; PPI Jan – Sep.

Consumer inflation rose from about 2.4% to 4.2% in three months as fuel became more expensive. It eased to 3.4% in July and August, then rose to 3.7% in September — above the 3.6% analysts expected — with gasoline prices running 34% above a year earlier (BLS, Oct 14; AP). Core inflation, which excludes food and energy, rose to 2.6% from 2.4% over the year. Core prices rose 0.3% in September, matching August’s monthly increase.

Producer prices rose 6.3% in September compared with a year earlier, the largest annual increase since December 2022. The seasonally adjusted monthly rise was 1.3%, the largest since March 2022. Goods prices rose 2.6% for the month, led by energy (+10.8%) and gasoline (+20.3%). Prices excluding food, energy and trade services rose 5.0% over the year (BLS, Oct 15). Businesses can face these higher costs before consumers see them in prices.

Higher energy costs can take more than a year to reach food prices

Natural gas is used to make ammonia, a key ingredient in nitrogen fertilizer. Higher gas and shipping costs can make food more expensive, but the effects may take more than a year to reach your grocery bill.

The timeline uses delays seen after energy prices rose in 2007–08 and 2022 to show when food prices could rise. It's a rough comparison with those periods, not a forecast from this model.

Gulf–India tanker shipping costs

+411%

$4.34/bbl in Aug vs pre-war (Frontline)

TTF gas (Europe)

$26.7/MMBtu

JOGMEC assessed Oct 9 (published Oct 13) · up from $24.6 on Oct 2

JKM gas (Asia)

≈$26.2/MMBtu

JOGMEC assessed Oct 9 (published Oct 13) · low-$26s, up from high-$24s on Oct 2

Higher energy prices can raise freight and fertilizer costs, affect planting and harvests, and eventually raise food prices. The bars show approximate periods based on the 2007–08 and 2022 price increases. The effects on food prices can take more than a year to appear.

What to watch next

Upcoming reports and decisions that could change the outlook.

Any day

Whether Saudi oil supplies keep moving. The Oct 13 attack damaged Aramco’s offices; no production damage has been reported (Reuters, Oct 14). The coalition said it intercepted a missile aimed at Yanbu on Oct 16; it didn’t identify the attacker (Yemen Monitor). Yanbu is the Red Sea outlet for the East–West pipeline, reported at 5.8M barrels a day on Oct 6; its sustained average is unverified (Bloomberg, Oct 12).

Watch for confirmed production losses, terminal damage at Yanbu, and whether tanker loadings keep up with pipeline flows.

Any day

Whether a new proposal leads to a US–Iran agreement. Qatar and Pakistan submitted a compromise plan, sources told The New Arab on Oct 20. Pakistan’s army chief reportedly delivered it in Tehran. No agreement has been officially announced.

Watch for an agreement, a change in the blockade, or renewed strikes. Any could change how much oil gets through.

Any day

Whether the Yemen offensive changes Red Sea shipping. Britain said on Oct 20 that RAF Typhoons will fly defensive missions to protect Saudi cities and infrastructure, without striking the Houthis (UK Ministry of Defence). Egypt’s parliament has postponed its vote on military support, which would depend on a Saudi request (Al Jazeera, Oct 19).

Watch whether more countries provide military support and whether shipping routes become safer. A confirmed Houthi attack on non-Saudi shipping could send container traffic back around Africa.

Any day

Whether oil keeps moving through Hormuz despite attacks. Kpler put crude exports at about 82% of pre-war levels and refined products at 44% (DPA, Oct 20). UKMTO’s latest weekly assessment recorded 12 attacks (Splash247, Oct 19). Iranian mine-strike claims remain unverified. Two Petro Dolphin crew remain missing after the Oct 11 attack.

Watch for crew updates, confirmed losses, and safe passage. Export volumes and ship counts measure different things; this report doesn’t replace the map’s earlier Kpler reading.

Any day

Whether Russian diesel reaches buyers. US Treasury license 135 permits diesel transactions through Apr 7, 2027. An Oct 16 order also waived the new Graham Act measures, leaving existing sanctions in place (White House). Novak reported an oil tanker’s departure from Dikson on Oct 17, but its cargo and destination are unverified (Anadolu). That doesn’t establish a diesel delivery.

Watch for verified diesel cargoes and further refinery shutdowns. The IEA says limited operating capacity constrains Russian exports, so easing restrictions may do little to relieve the shortage.

Oct 21

The next weekly EIA report is due Oct 21 at 10:30 a.m. Eastern, covering the week ending Oct 16. The latest report put SPR stocks at 283.0M barrels — unchanged on the week — and diesel and heating-oil stocks at 102.6M, 12.3% below last year. On Oct 16, DOE sought bids to exchange up to 17M barrels. Separately, Argus reported awards of 20–25M barrels on Oct 13, citing sources; that report remains unconfirmed by DOE in the sources reviewed.

Watch whether SPR stocks fall again and whether fuel stocks fall further. Deliveries from the sixth offering are scheduled for November–December.

Where shortages could appear next

These estimates show where shortages could worsen if the crisis continues. The dates are based on published stock levels, customs data, and export-ban schedules. The timing could be a week or two earlier or later.

Each weekly EIA report (next: Oct 21)

US East Coast — US diesel and heating-oil stocks stood at 102.6M barrels in the week ending Oct 9, down 2.5 million on the week and 12.3% below last year. At the four-week average rate of about 4.0M barrels a day, those stocks are equivalent to about 26 days of use. East Coast stocks are 22% below last year.

Oct 31

Russia — Russia’s diesel export ban for producers runs through Oct 31, although the government announced a partial lifting on Oct 10. Novak’s delivery schedule rises from 300,000 tons in October to 1M in December (Interfax, Oct 12). US permission doesn’t lift Russia’s restrictions. The IEA’s October report says limited operating refinery capacity makes the easing unlikely to materially change global diesel supplies.

≈ mid-October

China — Commercial oil stocks could begin to fall faster than normal.

≈ late October

Europe's oil hubs — Rotterdam-area diesel stocks could fall below 8.5–9M barrels, making it harder for traders to find supplies. If the strait closes fully, this could happen by mid-October.

Oct 17–20

France, at the pump — Cost-of-living and education protests turned violent over the weekend; parts of Paris, Bordeaux and Nice imposed curfews (Euronews, Oct 20). Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain agreed to sell France diesel equivalent to about 10% of its diesel consumption in the coming weeks, according to Elysee sources (Anadolu, Oct 20).

Nov 10–30

Air travel — Russia's jet-fuel export ban, in force since Jun 1, is due to end Nov 30. An extension would keep those export restrictions in place.