Hello Again: Replay Protected Monotonic Countersを悪用したWindows Hello PINの総当たり攻撃
Exploiting Replay Protected Monotonic Counters to Brute-Force Windows Hello PINs (arxiv.org)
要約
本論文では、Windows HelloのPIN認証におけるセキュリティ上の脆弱性を指摘しています。TPMのアンチハンマーイング保護を回避するため、Replay Protected Monotonic Counters (RPMC) の実装 flaw を悪用し、fTPMのロックアウトカウンターをロールバックすることで、4桁のWindows Hello PINをわずか40時間で特定できることを実証しました。
全文翻訳
Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
arXiv:2611.18126 (cs)
[Submitted on 13 Nov 2026]
Title:Hello Again: Exploiting Replay Protected Monotonic Counters to Brute-Force Windows Hello PINs
Authors:Christian Werling, Matti Finder, Hans Niklas Jacob, Julian Prein, Niclas Kühnapfel, Jean-Pierre Seifert
View a PDF of the paper titled Hello Again: Exploiting Replay Protected Monotonic Counters to Brute-Force Windows Hello PINs, by Christian Werling and 5 other authors
Abstract:Windows Hello is the primary authentication mechanism on over one billion Windows 11 devices, supporting PINs as short as four digits. Such low-entropy PINs are viable only because the TPM's anti-hammering protection mitigates brute-force attacks. Most modern x86 platforms rely on firmware TPMs (fTPMs) that persist their non-volatile (NV) state, including the lockout state, to SPI flash. On newer platforms, rollback prevention of this state is delegated to the flash chip via Replay Protected Monotonic Counters (RPMCs), a JEDEC-standardized mechanism operating over a physically accessible bus.
We present the first practical security analysis of RPMC in shipping x86 systems. Using low-cost interposer hardware, we identify multiple implementation flaws, two of which fundamentally undermine RPMC's security model: First, Winbond SPI flash - the leading NOR flash vendor with over 25% market share - leaks its HMAC key under voltage glitching, enabling arbitrary counter forgery. Second, AMD's NV controller does not verify RPMC increments, so an interposer can suppress them unnoticed. Moreover, AMD platforms without RPMC flash appear to lack NV rollback protection altogether: on two AMD desktops, reflashing an old image resets the fTPM's lockout counters.
Both flaws enable rollbacks of the fTPM's NV state (AMD, Intel, or Pluton), including its lockout counters. We demonstrate this end-to-end on locked, encrypted hardware: our setup finds a 4-digit Windows Hello PIN in 40 hours instead of 69 days. A compromised PIN also grants access to device-bound keys and Hello-based enterprise SSO. The same primitive defeats BitLocker's TPM+PIN pre-boot protector, reducing the worst-case time for a default-length 6-digit PIN from 19 years to 20 days.
| Comments: | This is a slightly updated version of the paper published at ACM CCS '26 (this https URL). The section Changes from the CCS '26 Version lists all changes |
| Subjects: | Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) |
| Cite as: | arXiv:2611.18126 [cs.CR] |
| (or arXiv:2611.18126v1 [cs.CR] for this version) | |
| https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2611.18126 arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration) | |
| Related DOI: | https://doi.org/10.1145/3830454.3846631 DOI(s) linking to related resources |
Submission history
From: Christian Werling [view email]
[v1] Fri, 13 Nov 2026 12:53:55 UTC (1,565 KB)
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View a PDF of the paper titled Hello Again: Exploiting Replay Protected Monotonic Counters to Brute-Force Windows Hello PINs, by Christian Werling and 5 other authors
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